

Series I
Correspondence,
1932-1973

Box 2, Folder 13

January 16, 1953 -
December 28, 1953

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Dear Joe, 1 July 1953
Problems of Japanese command analysis

Dear Chet (Wood), 12 October 1953
Portrait of Admiral Mahan

(*Dear Willie (Admiral Rees), 6 November 1953

(*Dear Admiral Larson, 30 November 1953
Problems of detachment of staff of Battle Evaluation
Group

Professor Armstrong, 28 December 1953
Savo Island, radio telephone communications

*Armstrong of Columbia University was the inventor of
FM radio.

January - December, '53

16 January 1953

Dear Captain Pressey:

I have returned to the War College and have referred to Admiral Conolly and Admiral Beakley the various propositions, i.e., contracts, which have been suggested in the Navy Department in relation to my employment should I be retired under the Davis Amendment. As I told you at the time, my thought was that the preferred contract was the consultative contract wherein I work for so much per day for two hundred and sixteen days. It is that type of contract which you are having your legal staff prepare at present.

I now find that neither Admiral Conolly nor Admiral Beakley, who is Chief of Staff, approve of this contract as such. They are willing to have it if it is the only way in which I can be employed. However, they much prefer a contract with Brown University, for example, wherein Brown will engage to provide certain consultative services in the preparation of the analyses being prepared by the War College, and in the production of the movie of Savo Island and any others. I am to be those services.

I endeavored to argue a little about this, but I have been told that they would prefer it. There are a number of reasons why the consultative contract is not good, some of which you mentioned to me. I would suggest in this matter that you contact Admiral Maurice E. Curtis, ACNO (Readiness), Room 4E552, who suggested this Brown University idea originally.

I am now quite interested in the Brown proposition, since, should I take it, I would not lose the 60% disability which I now have when on the retired list.

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I don't know what would be considered a proper payment for my services, but since I have been working the last few years for almost nothing--in that my retired pay, plus my limited personal income, is almost equal to what I draw as a Commodore on active duty-- I feel entitled to an increased compensation. The Chief of Staff of the War College stated to me that the War College does not desire that I take a beating on this contract, and he hoped that BuPers, if they issued the contract, would see that the contract gave me fair and just compensation for my services.

Please consult me, if you wish, on the telephone about this, but please submit your concept of this contract at the same time that you submit the consultative contract.

I appreciate all the courtesies which you and Captain Larson extended to me during my visit there. It is not unlikely that I may be down next week to see you about this, at a time of your own choosing. Or, you might like to come up here with your ideas in the matter. I am sure the War College would like to see you. Besides, a little rest won't hurt you.

With warmest personal regards, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

R. W. BATES

Captain George W. Pressey, USN,
Room 3072, Arlington Annex,
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.

0463

16 January 1953

Dear "Germany":

It was swell to see you back on duty in the Navy Department. I had heard that you had been ill, but you showed no signs to me of such a misfortune.

I appreciate your interest in my continuance on this job, and I want to assure you that I am grateful for the continuing support I get from you and which I got from Briscoe before you.

Upon my return to Newport, I discussed the suggested contract with both Admiral Conolly and Admiral Beakley. I spoke to them separately and, believe it or not, they don't particularly favor the consultative contract (216 days) because of the fact that there are 149 days wherein I can do as I wish, since I don't get paid for those days. They don't think that I would take a 149-day holiday, mind you, but they don't like the idea of it.

They favor the contract which you suggested--that is, an individual contract with Brown University--and I am beginning to think that I favor it also. The reasons for favoring it are: (1) it seems to suit the War College needs as viewed by the President; (2) I would not lose the advantages of my 60% disability income tax exemption in my retired pay. The Government gave me that for services rendered, and it is quite legal, therefore, for me to desire to retain it.

Under the conditions of such a contract with Brown, I would be able to keep my retired pay and draw pay from Brown at the same time. This is being done by many officers right now, notably Captain Durgin at Brown.

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Both Admiral Conolly and Admiral Beakely seem satisfied that President Wriston would be highly favorable to this contract, since the War College maintains close relations with Brown.

I have asked Captain George Pressey in BuPers (Training Division) to look into this matter. It would be nice if you would consult with him on the telephone and arrive at some proposition which you can submit to me and to the War College. Very frankly, I have been working under the rank of Commodore for very little indeed, since my retired income closely approximates my active duty income. I did it as a deed of love and loyalty, believe it or not!

I am naturally anxious to complete this present work (The Battle for Leyte Gulf), as it is the last of four planned. In addition, I am the producer and technical adviser of a film now underway in New York, called "The Battle of Savo Island." This film is based on my book of the same name, and will take about two and one-half hours and a large sum of money. This also should somehow be included in the contract with Brown.

With best regards to yourself, and hopes that everything is going as well as could be hoped, I am, as ever,

Your old friend,

Rear Admiral Maurice E. Curts, USN
Room 4E552, The Pentagon
Washington 25
D. C.

0465

January 22, 1953

Dear Captain Waterhouse:

In accordance with your advice and that of Rear Admiral "Casey" Green, written to me while he was still ACNO Personnel, the Naval War College is forwarding an official request asking that Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, USN(Ret), be permitted to remain on active duty at the Naval War College in order to continue his very important work in connection with the analysis of the Battle for Leyte Gulf.

When Captain Rochefort received his orders several months ago I wrote to Admiral Green, whom I know well, and asked for advice as to how to proceed. He replied immediately that a strong letter forwarded to the Bureau of Naval Personnel asking for Captain Rochefort's retention would probably be accepted. For administrative reasons, which I will discuss with you privately, Admiral Conolly desired to delay forwarding this letter until now. I do know that Admiral Conolly is very desirous of retaining Captain Rochefort.

I told Admiral Conolly of your friendly comments concerning my queries about Captain Rochefort and of how you had supported Admiral Green's concept that a letter would probably be sufficient.

For your information, we are working hard on the Battle for Leyte Gulf and have finished, as of now, the First Volume of this opus. There will be one or two more Volumes. We are now working on the Second Volume. Captain Rochefort has been working on the Japanese side and is fully familiar with the multitude of Japanese documents on this action. No one else knows them nearly so well as he.

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Captain Rochefort was recommended to this office by the Chief of Naval Intelligence for this work and he was accepted on the basis that since he would be doing "history" work, he would remain on duty until the work was finished. In fact, I had been advised by all Washington authorities, including those of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, that the War College would be wise to fill the World War II Battle Evaluation Group with Retired Officers because: (1) They would be permanent and (2) such permanency would maintain continuity. Certainly, in the case of Captain Rochefort, continuity is essential.

With best regards to you and Admiral Smoot, and with hopes for a favorable decision in this important case, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

R.W. BATES

Captain Jacob W. Waterhouse, USN,
Bureau of Naval Personnel (Pers B11A),
Room 2719, ARLINGTON ANNEX,
Department of the Navy,
Washington 25, D.C.

0467

January 22, 1953

Dear Captain Pressey:

I haven't been able to get to Washington as I planned because other matters have interfered and besides, I haven't heard from you.

The other day Vice Admiral E.L. Cochrane, USN(Ret), who was formerly head of the Maritime Board and is now the Dean of the Engineering and Naval Architecture at M.I.T. came here and made an address to the students. I mentioned to him the problem of a contract and was advised that M.I.T. had a lot of them--that it was a very simple thing to arrange--and that there were numerous kinds of contracts.

I discussed this again with Admiral Conolly who, in the end, is the ultimate authority and he was quite interested. Admiral Conolly reiterated to me yesterday that he preferred a university contract such as the one suggested by Curtis in Operations, and probably Pressey in Personnel.

Do you think you could come up here with your plan?

For your information, next week I am being ordered to New York to review for two days the "Story Board" for the film "Battle of Savo Island" which is being prepared by Film Graphics.

I have mentioned the above since I will be leaving on Wednesday, January 28th for New York and will remain there the 29th and 30th, returning on the 30th. Should you desire to come up next week it should be on Monday or Tuesday.

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Another subject: Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, USN(Ret), is my Japanese authority for this operation and has been working in this office for one and one-half years. No one knows the Japanese documents better than he and it is very important that he be retained with me in this work. The President of the Naval War College, on BuPers suggestion, forwarded an official letter yesterday asking for Captain Rochefort's retention. I think that it would be well if your office could assist the President in this matter by means best known to yourselves.

With best regards to you and Captain Larson, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

R.W. BATES.

Captain George W. Pressey, USN,
Bureau of Naval Personnel,
Room 3072, ARLINGTON ANNEX,
Department of the Navy,
Washington 25, D.C.

0469

January 24, 1953

Dear Mr. Blair:

I am forwarding herewith two letters from Captain Innis to me concerning the Battle of Savo Island story board. He has a number of good ideas, but he has one very bad one--so bad it very nearly vitiates most of his recommendations. It is this: he thinks that the films are supposed to be pure narrative. This, of course, as I have repeatedly pointed out, is not so. They are, instead, a study of command and therefore a certain amount of what seems to be lack of continuity must necessarily prevail. I have just written him on this subject, because it embarrasses me that a man who has worked in this office for two years could have failed to remember that vital point.

Since Captain Innis's letters only arrived today, Saturday, I have worked on them today. I think some of his ideas can be used. I have no objection to improving the continuity if at the same time we can maintain the command distinctions.

I am sending his letters to you now with the hope that you will be able to look at them prior to my arrival on Thursday. When the work presently before you is completed, I should like to take up this matter with you. I have a lot of respect for Captain Innis's ability and I appreciate the evident attention he gave to this story board. It might be possible, for example, to consolidate some of the air searches--particularly the land-based air searches--as he suggests, but I don't wish to do it too much for this reason: the films are divided into parts, as you know, and this has been done so that the films may parallel the book. If we made full continuity without due regard to the book structure, the above paralleling might not obtain.

I look forward to our meeting on the 29th and 30th. I shall be in New York on Wednesday, however, with Admiral

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Conolly, the President of the War College, since we are to attend a luncheon for Admiral Delany who is retiring, and are to attend also a Sheriff's Jury dinner. Why the latter I do not know!

Best regards to everyone,

Very sincerely yours,

Encl.(2)

R. W. BATES

Mr. Lee Blair,
Film Graphics, Inc.
245 West 55th Street
New York 19, N. Y.

0471

24 January 1953

Dear Walter:

Since writing to you the other day I have received your chronological notes, for which I give you thanks. You have evidently been very meticulous, which is not unusual with you, in going over the story board, and I think some of your suggestions are very helpful indeed. I have looked them over and am sending them on today to Film Graphics, where we will discuss them this coming week.

I shall, however, be a little reluctant to make all the changes you recommend for the reason that the book and the films are designed for high command study rather than for the general Naval public. The films, therefore, are ^{cut into} parts, to parallel the same parts in the book. Thus, if on board ship it is desired to study certain phases of this battle, the film will be available to assist in presenting the story and the criticisms. For your information, I have received some extraordinary letters from the Army War College concerning the films of the Battle of Midway and of the Battle of the Coral Sea, prepared in the manner above referred to.

I envy you your trip to the Fourteenth Naval District and even to the Marshall Islands, since a change is good for the soul. Don't drown in the Makalapa Pool at Pearl Harbor! It is nice of you to have your Mrs. down at Palm Beach. You are getting too wealthy for me. I have to straggle around as best I can while you hop from Puerto Rico to Hawaii and your wife from Washington to Palm Beach!

Cavanaugh is no longer with us. He went into some kind of mental breakdown and has been transferred to the hospital in Philadelphia. I don't know whether you knew it or not, but Cavanaugh was sick when he first came to this office. He discussed his problems with me, and I was successful for two years in keeping him in good shape. However, when it appeared that he was about to

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go to sea, his troubles came back on him. He had no objection to going to sea--it wasn't that--but the commotion attendant ^{thereupon} brought back ~~is~~ old trouble. None of us has heard from him since, and I certainly wish him the best of luck.

My best wishes to you, as ever,

Your old friend,

R. W. BATES

Captain Walter D. Innis, USN,
OP-82
Office of Shore Establishment Survey Board,
Room 4A716, Pentagon Building,
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.

0473

10 February 1953

Dear Larson:

Admiral Conolly called me in yesterday and showed me a letter from you relative to my prospective contract, and asked me if it was satisfactory. I said yes, that I had always said it was satisfactory, but that Admiral Curtis, Admiral Beakley and Admiral Conolly, in that order, had suggested a contract with the University. So, Admiral Conolly and Admiral Beakley prepared a letter from the War College embracing all the thoughts which you had expressed in your various letters, and also embracing in a general way the form letter prepared by your legal staff. I haven't seen the final draft, but I know Admiral Conolly thinks it is good. I hope this settles all argument in the matter and that we can operate here again without all the turmoil incident to change.

Admiral Conolly and I went to New York a week ago, where we reviewed the story-board of the Battle of Savo Island. The story-board is coming along very well, and I think you will be pleased with the film when it finally comes out. There is considerable more work to be done on the story-board. At the present time we are down to the battle lessons. Admiral Conolly has been quite startled by the depth of the study. He told me that he did not realize the depth of detail there was in it and that the study and the film will show most clearly the many failures of command that occurred on that memorable and unhappy night.

I am sorry to lose Captain Rochefort, who is my Japanese language officer. He leaves on 2 March.

Please give my best to Captain Pressey. I think you both should know that Admiral Conolly will go to Washington today and will be in BuPers probably tomorrow or Thursday.

Best regards,

R. W. BATES

Captain H. O. Larson, USN
Training Division, Bureau of Naval Personnel
Room 3074, Arlington Annex
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

0474

April 21, 1953

Dear Joe:

I was very pleased to receive your letter, and therein to learn your address so I could send you the Japanese writeup for October 17th from Volume II. I have already sent a copy to Kawakami, but of course haven't as yet heard anything. I understand that you have taken with you one copy of your draft of the Japanese side so that you might check what I send. I am therefore sending you my writeup, which I hope you will be able to look over in your spare time and give us the benefit of your knowledge of the subject. You forecast that I would cut it down. On the contrary, I found it necessary to expand it considerably, because, in studying the actions of the commanders, you cannot discuss any one of them without indicating in detail what information he had. Also, you will notice that I introduced Commander South West Area Force in order to maintain the continuity. I hope that this writeup meets with your approval.

Needless to say, you have been missed around here. I have looked up, in a mild way, as to whether you could come back again, but nobody knows anything at present. The Navy Department is very concerned over these financial cuts, and they aren't sure what they mean. I am still on duty--that is, active duty--and have signed no contract whatsoever. The contract has been sent here, but the Bureau of Personnel has indicated that they weren't quite sure what to do about it. So, we are investigating, also in a mild way, other means to see what can be done, if worst comes to worst. At the present moment, there seems to be an opinion that I will be kept on active duty, temporarily at least. I have said nothing.

Your trip across the country seems to have been quite unusual, and your final 700-mile drive a definitely remarkable performance, although not a wise performance for older people. It is your daughter who is graduating from college, you know, and not you and Fay.

I have told George Phelan about your letter to me, and I expect him here today to read it.

I particularly enjoyed your paragraph with reference to your service in this office. I can reciprocate your kind remarks and say that had you not been here, we would have found it

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much more difficult to have proceeded with this work as well as we have. You understand the Japanese, and you understand their language--something no one here at the College does adequately.

Your wife has been missed already in this community. She is a wonderful person, and her kindly interest in the Navy Relief Society and other charitable work of this sort is not long unrecognized. I think it is swell that we have within the Navy women of her consequence who will give of their time that others might be happy. I shall always look at my blue socks and think of the inscription, "From the needles of Fay Rochefort."

I was interested in your new address--or is it your old one? Houses on Manhattan Beach, I suppose, will always sell, but somehow I prefer a lawn to sand. Or was your comment on that merely a figure of speech?

We are preparing for the Global Strategy discussions now, and the Reserves will arrive at the end of this week, the civilians at the end of the following week. The phone in this office is ringing constantly from the Admiral to discuss who's who and why. It bothers me some, but must be borne.

With best regards to you and yours, I am, as ever,

Your old friend,

encl.

Captain J. J. Rochefort, USN(Ret)
225 Third Street
Manhattan Beach
California

0476

April 29, 1953

Dear Bill:

It has been many years since I have had occasion to communicate with you or even see you, but since you are riding high as Secretary to the Joint Chiefs of Staff I thought I would bother you for a moment. As you perhaps know, I am here at the War College writing a critical analysis of the major naval battles of World War II from the viewpoint of command. Perhaps you have seen the volumes on Coral Sea, Midway and Savo Island. I am now on Leyte.

In the Leyte operation, I find that the Japanese apparently allowed their subordinate commanders to activate SHO One at a time pleasing to themselves and not at all at the time designated by Imperial General Headquarters. For example, the Commander in Chief Combined Fleet activated SHO One at 1732 on October 18th. As is shown in the two enclosed drafts, one of his subordinates activated it some three hours later, and the Japanese Army in the Philippine area activated it at about midnight. I have endeavored to compare this to the American system in effect then (1944) and now, and I am sending you herewith, as mentioned above, two drafts of this discussion. Would you mind looking through these two drafts and seeing which one is correct for American practice in 1944 and today? If you do not agree with either of these writeups, please write in what is correct and I will cite you as a footnote reference.

I always remember the old days on Admiral Woodward's staff in 1935 when we had those serious discussions which Woodward persisted in ignoring and thereby nearly hung himself.

Best regards, old friend. If you have any 'hot dope' to forward to me, I wouldn't mind hearing it.

As ever,

Your old friend,

R. W. BATES

Encls(2)/

Rear Admiral William G. Lalor, USN
Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Room 2E928 PENTAGON BUILDING
Washington 25, D.C.

0477

11 May 1953

I am most happy to learn that your publisher is interested in having you prepare a history of the achievements of the United States Navy. Needless to say, we are proud of what we have been able to achieve, just as we are aware of our failures. It is flattering to hear that the French people would be interested in hearing more about us; and yet again, why not?--the French have long had a proud sea tradition, as all Americans well know, and French sea and land power contributed greatly to the success of the American Revolution. The names of Rochambeau, de Grasse and de Ternay are well treasured memories in American naval history.

With your background, both Navy and Air Force, you will be able to present a more objective view, which will not only interest the French people but will interest the American public as well. So, I am happy to assure you that such a book written in the French language by a Frenchman of your outstanding literary and military qualifications should be very successful. Therefore, far from disliking the idea, I think it an excellent one.

Your book might do a great deal to create better understanding of the importance of sea power to the NATO alliance, and of the probable roles of the several navies in that alliance in the event of war. I do not wish to attempt to orient your theme, but I do feel that your book would be of the greatest value and interest if it related the lessons of the past to the problems facing the world at present. It is often a fact that only by such examples can the lessons of history be completely understood.

I am enclosing herewith the titles of some of the books which I feel might be helpful to you.

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Meanwhile, I want to tell you again of how pleased I was to have you here with us during our strategic discussions. It is only through close association, such as was obtained here during your visit, that we officers can even begin to understand one another and one another's problems. I hope for a similar exchange of views next year.

With warmest personal regards, I am,

R. L. CONOLLY

Encl/

Admiral TUBELAIN

15 May 1953

Dear Joe:

Global Strategy is over now; it was extremely successful. We had many outstanding civilians here, and, although the weather for the first week of the discussions was rather bad, only the Reserves had to face that weather. Graduation here will be in June, and I will send you an invitation so that, if you feel like coming, you can notify the Aide.

Changes are beginning to occur around here. Admiral Beakley will leave on the second of June; Captain Olsen, who is to command the YELLOWSTONE, and Colonel Berkeley, who is to be with General Sheppard at the Marine Barracks in Washington, are both leaving today. So, a lot of our old friends will be replaced by newcomers.

I received a letter yesterday from the Navy Department. It is quite quaint, in that it says they are continuing me on duty "past June 30, 1953." This is a remarkable thing, because I still don't know whether I'm here tomorrow or not! I am planning, therefore, to go to Washington in a few days to clear up the whole situation.

Your friend Captain Anderson is quite concerned; he seems to have heard nothing. Also, Admiral Morison has heard nothing. Anderson hears rumors that Admiral Heffernan will retire, owing to ill health, and he would like that job. I know nothing more about that.

I have received two or three interesting comments from Mr. Kawakami on my write-up for CinC Combined Fleet on October 18th. I asked him to give it his immediate attention because it had to do with the activation of SHO One. We have gotten it pretty well smoothed out now. As usual, I don't accept all of his comments; but, like a cheese, he is ripening with time. I don't know whether he will remain over, but I doubt it.

I will send you a copy of the 18th as far as I have gone presently, and I hope that you will have time to look at it. Evidently, with your personal work out there you haven't had much time to look at the other stuff I sent you.

I see your friend George Phelan every now and then. Washington has been putting the bee on those boys to do something, so they have been very busy. They lose both Kemble and McGovern

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at the end of June.

My best to both you and your Mrs. I will advise you further after I go to Washington.

As ever,

Your old friend,

Captain J. J. Rochefort, USN(Ret)
225 Third Street
Manhattan Beach
California

0481

May 18, 1953

Dear Joe:

We finally heard from Captain Ohmae via Mr. Kawakami, and I am enclosing herewith Kawakami's letter to me and Ohmae's letter to Kawakami.

I have availed myself of some of this information to write the Japanese side of the 18th and Kawakami and I have been in considerable discussion over it. Ohmae is not clear, and as Kawakami points out, it is somewhat extraneous. Nevertheless, some of the information that I desired is in it. In addition Kawakami has submitted data to show that the pressure for activating SHO One came from the Southern Army.

I am going to Washington tomorrow evening to see what is happening to my translators. They promised all translations through by June and now find they are behind four CA reports, two CL reports and numerous DD reports. Kawakami is going to try to expedite them.

With best regards to you and your Mrs., I am, as ever,

Your old friend,

R.W. BATES.

Encl/

Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, USN(Ret),
225 Third Street,
Manhattan Beach, California.

0482

18 May 1953

Dear Germany:

I plan to be in Washington on Wednesday, Thursday and Friday of this week, and hope to consult with you regarding your query to Admiral Beakley concerning the employment of Mrs. Tanaka. Actually, I don't know much about the translators at present, since the whole situation has been confused and still is. They have completed the vast portion of the translation work, but still have about six cruisers and some destroyers left to translate. I am trying to rush them along.

Translation is very difficult, if it is to be accurate. Mrs. Tanaka is a good translator, but not accurate in the full sense of the word; therefore, Mr. Kawakami, with his superior knowledge of operations and history, must straighten out her translations. I had thought that we would be done with them by the end of June, and perhaps we will, but I will tell you about this when I have discussed it more fully with my translators. At any rate, I am delighted to know that you are still there, as you understand my problem very well.

I have been notified by the Bureau of Personnel that they plan to retain me on active duty after June 30th, which I take to mean indefinitely; but no one knows. I must clarify this also.

Best regards, and many thanks for your kindly and effective interest in my job. If it will do you any good, I want you to know that during Fleet Week here many admirals came down to my office, and some of them, notably Stump and Ballantine, were so impressed that they told Admiral Beakley that the job must not die under any circumstances.

As ever, your old friend,

R. W. BATES

Rear Admiral M. E. Curts, USN
Room 4E552, Pentagon Building
Washington, D. C.

0483

18 May 1953

Dear Carl:

I will be down in Washington presently to discuss my translator, Mr. Kawakami, with you. I don't know what the financial arrangements are, and I had his promise that he would be finished by the end of June. Unfortunately, he will not be finished by that time, although he will not be too far away from it. However, he has a lot of Japanese contacts which we have been drawing on, and it might be well for us to hold him over for another two or three months at least.

I have never congratulated you on your selection to be head of ONI, but I can assure you that, from my viewpoint, the choice was magnificent.

Your friend Norman Whitehouse often asks for you, and I want to see you for him as well as for myself.

Best regards, as ever,

Your old friend,

R. W. BATES

Rear Admiral Carl F. Espe, USN
Room 5C573, Pentagon Building
Washington
D. C.

0484

28 May 1953

Dear Roland:

This is to thank you for your friendly attitude toward the Naval War College, and particularly toward the case of Commander C. A. Marinko, 81010, USN, who is working with me here on the Battle of Leyte Gulf. I have told Admiral Conolly and Admiral Beakley that you agreed to hold him for another year, which will complete two years at the War College for him. They were very pleased. This decision of yours is entirely satisfactory to Commander Marinko, who is quite anxious to remain.

It was nice to see you down there and to realize that, even with the terrific load you have to carry, you seem to carry it easily.

I had a very wonderful talk with Admiral Holloway on the subject of the War College and what we are doing here. He looks to me to be a swell choice for Chief of Naval Personnel, since he knows all of the problems, as well as all of the 'angles', and can make decisions.

With best regards to yourself, I am, as ever,

Your old friend,

R. W. BATES

Rear Admiral Roland N. Smoot, USN
Room 8713, Arlington Annex
Navy Department
Washington 25, D. C.

0485

28 May 1953

Dear Jimmie:

It was a great pleasure to me to be able to sit with you in your headquarters and discuss two matters which are dear to both of our hearts: (1) the education of naval officers for high command, and (2) the Naval War College, which is the principal instrument for the accomplishment of (1), above.

I told Admiral Conolly of your thoughts and of your complete support of him and of the Naval War College, and he was very pleased indeed.

We all knew, when you were appointed Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Personnel and Chief of Naval Personnel, that any problems in connection with these matters would be swiftly and correctly ironed out. You were a wonderful choice!

With best regards and many thanks for your interest, I am, as ever,

Your old friend,

R. W. BATES.

Vice Admiral J. L. Holloway, Jr., USN
Chief of Naval Personnel
Room 2072, Arlington Annex
Navy Department
Washington 25, D. C.

0486

28 May 1953

Dear John:

It was nice to see you down there, and to observe that you had improved in health. I was a little concerned when I last saw you, since you seemed so thin; but you are filling out again and, I presume, will be fully well presently. I was also glad to see that you are holding your job as Historian of the Navy. Things seem to be going well, and when they are I see no reason for change, particularly in historical work. Should you ever leave, I don't know who would seek the assignment; but there are always 'seekers', so I suppose a relief would be readily found.

My translator, Mr. Kawakami, is being detached on June 12th, since no more funds are available at present in ONI to retain him even for consultation. I have so advised him. I am interested, however, in the handling of the papers which he has down there. I think that, for the present, since Mrs. Tanaka (who is employed under Operational Readiness--Admiral Curts) will be there, his papers can be turned over to her custody.

In order to assist Admiral Morison in his work and to save the Government money, I have for some time been making up copies of each of the translations as follows: one for Mr. Pineau for his Washington files, and one for Admiral Morison for his personal file, I think in Cambridge. In order to facilitate my own work here, I have been making one copy for my office and one copy for our Naval War College archives; and to facilitate our work down in Washington, I have had a copy made for Mrs. Tanaka and one for Mr. Kawakami.

For some reason, all translations received from the Washington Document Center during its existence were, in general, marked RESTRICTED. I think that was done because they did not wish them made available to the public. In the translations which we have been making, the RESTRICTED tag has been left off inadvertently. I think that this is a mistake, since these translations, which are being done for the War College only, under the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations, are not being made available as yet to the general public insofar as I know, since I control the only translations. I should appreciate your kindness if you would advise me immediately as to whether or not we should have all of these translations labelled RESTRICTED. However, whether so labelled or not, it is not unlikely that I will recall them presently to insure that I have them all. Then I will get together

0487

with you to determine their final disposition, since they will probably be of more importance to you than to us.

Our weather has suddenly improved. It is cool and pleasant, and the humidity which had bothered us all has departed. Let's hope that it continues!

With best regards, as ever,

Your old friend,

R. W. BATES

Rear Admiral J. B. Heffernan, USN,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Room 2509, MAIN NAVY,
Navy Department
Washington 25, D. C.

0488

June 19, 1953

Dear Roland:

I received your very thoughtful letter concerning Commander Marinke and, although he was about to start on a few days leave, I recalled him and advised him to read your letter. He did, and appreciates your recommendations and feels that they are sound. However, he has had this stomach trouble for sometime and since he has been in this office has finally commenced feeling well. He thinks that for health reasons he wants to remain for one more year here so that the difficulty which has caused his stomach trouble, whatever it was, will have completely disappeared.

I want you to know that he will write you presently the formal letter which you request.

Very frankly, I exercised no pressure on him. I told him his decision must be entirely his own. He said that he had already talked it over with his wife and that they had decided that a healthy Marinke is better than a sick one. Commander Marinke feels that by June 54' he will be so well that he can go to sea and do any duty effectively.

Had he decided not to remain, I had planned to ask you to hold him for some months so that I might complete with him the work that he has been doing, otherwise it may be lost.

I am writing to you to explain Commander Marinke's viewpoint in this matter so that you won't get the idea that he is a "shore-hound"--which he is definitely not! He merely feels that he will be a much better man for the good of the Navy if he remains one more year in his present work than he would be if he were sent to sea now. At the present moment no one knows better than he how he feels as regards his health and I respect his view.

Thank you also for sending me the latest list of Flag Officers.

With very best regards, I am, as ever,

Your old friend,

Rear Admiral Roland N. Smoot, USN
Bureau of Naval Personnel,
Room 2713, ARLINGTON ANNEX,
Arlington, Virginia.

R.W. BATES.

0489

26 June 1953

Dear Admiral Momsen:

I want to thank you very much for looking over some of my papers on the submarine operations in the Pacific. I feel sure that what we have here is correct because it is based on the documents, such as the submarine patrol reports, and on the surviving dispatches. As I said yesterday, the book was reviewed by a number of submarine officers including Admirals Yeomans, Wilson, and Tschenor, and Captains Post and Nauman. What I was particularly interested in, in view of your experience as a squadron commander and also as Commander Submarine Force Pacific, was whether my general concept of how the operations were conducted, and of the chain of command, are correct. From your reaction to certain portions which I read I could see that the write-up is correct there also.

I realize that these analyses will probably not be rewritten for a very long time, if ever, and therefore I am extremely anxious that they are right.

I often ask the top commanders questions as to the reason for their decisions and I get numerous answers. The reason for this is, and I have it posted on my office bulkhead as a guide--"The finest memory is less enduring than the poorest ink." I have to be careful not to permit any commander to unduly influence my judgement because each commander should have equal privilege in this matter and some are dead! I feel that when we confine ourselves to the records on hand we generally avoid that.

I haven't as yet decided whether or not to remove Admiral Yeomans' comment wherein he disagrees with the idea that, "Many submarine commanding officers did not view with favor those assignments which tended to remove them from the anti-shiping field." I am very friendly with Admiral Yeomans and we talked this thing over. I have never liked it and you, so far as I am concerned, have tended to scuttle it.

0490

-2-

With reference to the comments concerning the XXI Bomber Command and the B-29 attacks from Saipan against Japan, I am happy to state that these attacks did not commence until 24 November 1944, which was six weeks after the matter under discussion. While you are quite right in saying that you had seen them in the Marianas during October; this was because they were assembling there preliminary to the strikes on Japan.

If in visiting you I took too much of your time, I am very sorry. You can be sure that I was a little surprised to discover that it was 1220.

Many thanks for your courtesies.

With very best regards, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

R.W. BATES

Rear Admiral Charles B. Momsen, USN
Commandant FIRST Naval District
Navy Building
495 Summer Street
Boston, Massachusetts

0491

30 June 1953

Dear Mr. Ward:

It was with sincere regret that I learned that you had decided to retire as of June 30th. You have been at the Naval War College so long and have become such a permanent part of the College that I can scarcely visualize the establishment without you.

I want to thank you for the very effective help you have given me over the years. You and your drafting room staff have become very important to the World War II Battle Evaluation Group and the success of this latter group stems in a large measure from the assistance you and your staff have given it.

I know that you are an excellent draftsman and have done very well indeed as head of the drafting room. I know also that your services as a War College War Games Expert were very effective and contributed much to the success of the War College Maneuver Problems.

I wish you all happiness on the retired list which privilege you have justly earned.

With best regards, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

R.W. BATES
Rear Admiral, USN(Ret).

Mr. Charles H. Ward
2 Canonicus Avenue
Newport, R.I.

0492

ROCHEFORT

1 July 1953

Dear Joe:

It is a strange thing, but it is well known that if you mention someone, that someone appears. This morning, George Phelan came in to see me and we were talking about you. I told him I was trying to get the write-up of the Japanese side for October 18th in shape to send to you, but, for various reasons, had been delayed. Immediately after George left, I received your letter of June 25th, for which I am grateful.

I am enclosing herewith the Japanese side for the 18th, which is Chapter IV, and I hope that you will have time to read it over and give me your comments on it. I do not think that the objections which you have to Kawakami and Ohmae will be found in this write-up, but if so, I would appreciate having your reaction and your recommended changes. I don't accept all that Ohmae says, either, but whenever he points out that a good idea originated with the Army, I have been inclined to believe it. Kawakami, unfortunately, having been associated with the Army for so long, has a definite bias in that direction, although I will say this for him: he was quite critical of Mr. Roger Pineau's editing of the Koyanagi article in the "Proceedings". He says the article is absolutely confused and cannot be supported, in many places, by the facts, but that Pineau missed all this. You and I, of course, know that what Kawakami says in this regard is correct.

The problem I had in solving the Japanese command situation, with respect to CinC Combined Fleet's actions, was to separate the wheat from the chaff. You will observe that Ohmae very frankly admits that the ideas he has are the general opinions of the high command of that time rather than the factual dispatches originating during the period in question. I have accepted the idea that the activation of SHO One came as an impulse from the Army. They had to get their planes and troops into the area as laid down in the Army plan. You will note that there is a difference between the Army and the Navy in the SHO One Plan. This difference was not stressed in Volume I, but I am having to stress it here to indicate command frailties in the overall strategic direction of the war.

0493

With reference to your comments concerning DesOpOrd 361, there is some merit in them. However, there is a difference between the OS48 dispatch, which was DesOpOrd 352, and DesOpOrd 361 referred to by Ohmae. DesOpOrd 352 said, "The Advance Expeditionary Force will urgently prepare to sortie to the Central and Southern Philippines area." DesOpOrd 361, according to Ohmae, said, "As soon as sortie preparations are completed, the Advance Expeditionary Force will speedily advance to the waters east of the Central and Southern Philippines and attack the enemy fleet and transport convoys." You can see here that the one is a preparation order, the other an order of execution.

I have tried to work in the SUIKOSHA meeting, and I hope that you approve of the manner in which I have presented it. I deliberately left out the word SUIKOSHA because it means 'Navy Club', and without you here to explain it, I was afraid it might sound as though it was a low-level conference rather than the high-level meeting which it was.

I have done nothing about the pincers operation, as that does not enter the picture for some time yet.

I was very delighted about the announcement of your daughter's graduation, and I am also delighted that she is now staying with you. I think it is quite wonderful that your whole family is with you at last.

You can readily see from the above comments that I need your help here in solving these Japanese problems. I have been associated with you--and somewhat with Mr. Kawakami, who, by the way, is no longer with us, although Mrs. Tanaka is--long enough so that I can detect a lot of the weaknesses of Ohmae's arguments. On the other hand, I have not given up the thought of trying to get you back here when the Navy Department has settled down under the new regime. They are going to permit Captain Anderson to return to active duty commencing 1 September through 31 December. An arrangement of that sort, of course, would be of no use either to you or to me.

Best regards to you and your family, and with deep appreciation of your thoughtful interest in the work we are doing here, I am, as ever,

Your old friend,

R. W. BATES

0494

-3-

P.S. - I expect to be in California for two weeks around the latter part of July, and I will call you on the phone.

RWB

0495

2 July 1953

Dear Joe:

I am sending you herewith, in addition to Chapter IV which you have already received, Mr. Kawakami's comments on the portion of Chapter IV dealing with the operations of CinC Combined Fleet on October 18th. Where I have accepted his comments, I have already corrected the record; where I have not accepted them, I have made no changes. I do not know whether these comments of Kawakami's will help you or not, as the record is not the same as it was when these comments were made.

Mr. Kawakami had a rather serious comment concerning the San Bernardino route; this I have accepted to a limited degree. In the first place, I do not consider it a serious flaw. Secondly, I have referred the matter to my staff and they concur with my view. However, I am enclosing his comment, together with the revised pages. Mr. Kawakami, on occasion, speaks without being fully familiar with the subject matter. In this connection, Mobile Force Order #76 states, "In certain circumstances the oilers will be sent ahead and will proceed directly." You will note that it does not say that the tankers will always be sent ahead, but rather only "in certain circumstances."

I will appreciate your comments on the enclosed material.

With best regards and many thanks for your interest, I am, as ever,

Your old friend,

R. W. BATES

Captain J. J. Rochefort, USN (Ret.)
225 Third Street
Manhattan Beach, California

0496

6 July 1953

Dear Mr. Johnson:

I am returning herewith the paper concerning the script approval. In signing this paper, I presume that the script is correct. I have not, as yet, received a copy of the corrected script, except as noted on the story-board. As I told you over the 'phone, I think the story-board is correct--at least it reads correctly --but may require some limited modification when it is spoken. I explained that to you, and was advised by you that limited modifications were to be expected during the filming. I feel that on that basis I am justified in signing the whole thing, although here it must be remembered that there is one Battle Lesson which we may change. (The matter was thoroughly discussed with Mr. Blair at the time it arose.) That is the one concerning the method of enemy capabilities vs. the method of enemy intentions. You will remember that Admiral Conolly changed that, as was his right as President of the War College, but he also said that he was sure it would be changed by any subsequent President. I have been hoping that I would be able to talk him into accepting the original Battle Lesson before too long, and I wish to reserve the right to make that change. Admiral Conolly is away in Washington, where he has been for the past month and will be for another month, and it is hard to contact him.

As you know, I am going to California next Sunday, and hope to be away between two and three weeks.

With best regards, and hoping that what I have had to say in no way embarrasses you, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

R. W. BATES

Mr. Garrett I. Johnson
U.S. Naval Photographic Center
Naval Air Station
Anacostia 20, D. C.

0497

31 July 1953

Dear Savvy:

The World War II Battle Evaluation Group of the War College is now undertaking the strategical and tactical analysis of the Battle for Leyte Gulf in 1944.

The Battle of Surigao Straits was one of the important battles of this campaign. I remember well that you commanded the good ship PENNSYLVANIA in this battle.

Since there are no records available to clarify a few puzzling questions that have arisen in connection with this study, I am appealing directly to the Commanding Officers concerned to aid me, if they are able to do so. Of course, I realize, however, that this action occurred nearly nine years ago and perhaps you have forgotten certain details about it. On the other hand, it is just possible that you have not, or at least you may have retained some notes thereon.

These are the questions I should like answered:

- (1) The ammunition allowance of the PENNSYLVANIA for 14 inch AP was 240; however, in your action report you stated that you had on board 360 rounds. Do you remember if this is correct?
- (2) If it is correct, where were you able to get this number, on whose authority, and how were you able to stow the extra ammunition, presuming that you carried your full allowance of HC for shore bombardment?

Outside of this, I am interested in learning how you are enjoying retired life in South Carolina. My home is in California where I have been recently on leave. It was swell.

Dick Conolly is President of this institution and has done very well indeed. He had succeeded in raising the standard of the War College to a point where we seem to top them all.

Best to you, as ever,

Your old friend,

Commodore C.F. Martin, USN(Ret)
3219 Heyward Street
Columbia, 9, South Carolina

R.W. BATES

0498

31 July 1953

Dear Harry:

The World War II Battle Evaluation Group of the War College is now undertaking the strategical and tactical analysis of the Battle for Leyte Gulf in 1944.

The Battle of Surigao Straits was one of the important battles of this campaign, and I remember well that you commanded the good MINNEAPOLIS in this battle.

Since there are no records available to clarify a few puzzling questions that have arisen in connection with this study, I am appealing directly to you to aid me to clear up one of these problems concerning the ammunition. I realize that this action occurred nearly nine years ago and that you may have no notes from which to refresh your memory. However, I hope that this is not so.

These are the questions I should like answered:

(1) In your action report you stated that you expended 300 rounds of 8" AP. Considering that your allowance for 8" AP was only 315, did you have only 15 rounds of AP on board after the action? In other words, did you have originally more than 315 AP on board?

(2) If you were under allowance, where were you able to get the extra AP ammunition and by whose authority? Assuming that you carried your full allowance of 8" HC, how were you able to stow the extra ammunition?

Now to revert to the personal--"how are you?" and how are you enjoying your retirement? California is a swell place--I'm from Alameda--and I like it there tremendously. In fact, I have just returned from the Bohemian Grove.

Best to you, as ever,

Your old friend,

R.W. BATES.

Rear Admiral Harry B. Slocum, USN(Ret) ✓
28 La Crescenta Street
Vallejo, California

0499

31 July 1953

Dear John:

As you know The World War II Battle Evaluation Group of the War College is now undertaking the strategical and tactical analysis of the Battle for Leyte Gulf in 1944.

The Battle of Surigao Straits was one of the important battles of this campaign, and in this battle I know that you commanded the good old TENNESSEE.

Since there are no records available to clarify a few puzzling questions that have arisen in connection with this study, I am appealing directly to the Commanding Officers concerned to aid me whenever they are able. I realize that this battle occurred nearly nine years ago, and perhaps you have forgotten many of the details. However, on the other hand, it may be that you either remember or have retained notes which will have the data desired.

These are the questions I should like answered:

1. The ammunition allowance of the TENNESSEE for 14 inch AP was 240 rounds. You reported over TBS prior to the action that you had on board 396 rounds. Do you remember if this is correct?
2. If it is correct, where were you able to get this number of rounds and on whose authority?
3. Presuming, that you carried your full allowance of HC for shore bombardment, how were you able to stow the extra ammunition?

Outside of this how are you? I have just returned from a short trip to California and the Bohemian Grove. It was nice. I observed there, Generals Spaatz, Wedemeyer, Holland, Smith, Hunt, Admirals Rogers, Entwistle, Low, Redman and others.

Best to you.

Sincerely,

Rear Admiral John B. Hefferman, USN
Director of Naval History
Room 2509, MAIN NAVY,
Navy Dept.
Washington, 25, D. C.

R. W. BATES

0500

17 August 1953

Dear Carl:

As you know, this office is producing the Battle for Leyte Gulf and is now on Volume II. At no time in any of the analyses heretofore written has this office been given the ULTRA dispatches which provided to the high command intelligence data on the Japanese operations.

Although this information was not heretofore requested in writing, I have inquired on several occasions as to whether I could obtain it, since it seems to me that it should be helpful in explaining some of the decisions of our commanders.

Volume I, which covered the operations of both the Allied and Japanese forces up to 0719, October 17th--the time when Admiral Struble of Admiral Oldendorf's command seized Suluan Island--has been completed, and I do not think that the ULTRA information would have made much difference, since we had intelligence information from other sources.

I have worked up the Japanese side for the 17th, 18th and 19th of October now, and am on the 18th of October for the American side. I am interested in knowing whether the ULTRA information is still tightly held and not available to me. If we can't have it, we can't have it, and we will say nothing further about it. However, I have been asked on several occasions here recently if I had the ULTRA dispatches and I have said, in general, "no". I spoke to an officer from Washington about them, and he said they were even more secret than ever and therefore not available to this analysis. However, you are the authority, and I would be interested in having your reactions in this matter.

With best regards, I am, as every

Your old friend,

R. W. BATES

RADM Carl F. Espe, USN
Director, Naval Intelligence
Room 5C572, PENTAGON, Building, Washington 25, D.C.

0501

August 26, 1953

Dear Dr. Rice:

I spoke to the President of the Naval War College, Vice Admiral R.L. Conolly, concerning your very kind offer to present to the Naval War College Library bound volumes of the Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society since 1830. Admiral Conolly, who is at present in New York, asked me to tell you that the War College would be very gratified to receive your collection for the War College and has asked me to convey to you his appreciation of your kind offer.

I will call on you presently concerning this matter and will make arrangements for delivery of the books.

With very best personal regards, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

R.W. BATES,
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret).

Dr. A. Hamilton Rice
"Miramar"
Bellevue Avenue
Newport, R.I.

0502

27 August 1953

Dear Sir:

I have an inquiry to make concerning a favor which was done for me recently by one of your officers. I wanted to address this to Captain Major personally, but in view of the prospective change of command indicated in the current PACFLT Organization, it seems best to address it simply to the Commanding Officer.

Last July, when I was in California, Admiral Nimitz presented two books to the Naval War College, which he autographed. He gave me the books to bring to the War College and gave me certain instructions about them. The books--names unknown--were in two volumes, about two inches thick. As I was unable to carry them in the airplane because of their size and weight, I took them to your headquarters at the Naval Air Station, Alameda, and requested that they be mailed to me here. One of your top officers--I think it was your Operations Officer--kindly took the books and agreed to mail them to me here at the War College so that I might present them to Admiral Conolly from Admiral Nimitz. I have now waited a month and the books have not yet appeared at the War College.

I would appreciate it if you would check to ascertain whether or not these books were mailed and when they may be expected here. I dislike to bother you about this, because it was a very kindly act on the part of your office to take these books for me, but everyone here is now wondering where the books are, and I am afraid that presently Admiral Nimitz will ask what has happened to them and what was the reaction of the College to receiving them.

Sincerely,

R. W. BATES
Rear Admiral, USN (Ret)

Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Air Station
Alameda, California

0503

September 1, 1953

Dear Lee:

I have no doubt that you were as disappointed as I was that Admiral Conolly was unable to go to your factory. He had planned to go and had me make arrangements with you. Why he did not go, I do not know, but something blocked him and he came back. I know that he is very interested in hearing your voices as I was interested in having him hear them too, because I think them quite good. My only complaint is that your last voice referred to Mikawa as MI kawa instead of MI KA wa. I think that the voices should all be the same. I don't really know what is right and it may be that when you hear them together, there isn't any particular variation noticeable.

I hope that you will let me know a little while in advance when you want me up there again so that I will not get tied up here.

Sincerely yours,

R.W. BATES

Mr. Lee Blair
Film Graphics Inc
245 W. 55th Street
New York City, N.Y.

0504

12 October 1953

Dear Chet:

I was quite interested in receiving your letter regarding the portrait of Admiral Mahan and I have hastened to do something about it. I have had one of our artists copy the Mahan portrait --that is the head of the portrait--and I am sending it to you under separate cover. For your information, the pastel, which I am sending you, was viewed today separately by both Mrs. Reginal Norman, who is the daughter of Captain William McCarthy Little who worked here at the War College for many years with Admiral Mahan, and by General Louis Little, USMC(Ret), Captain Little's son. Both Mrs. Norman, and General Little think that this is an excellent likeness of the Admiral as they remember him. The recognition in each case was so surprisingly immediate that I think that the pastel is a very good job indeed.

We know nothing of the decorations, so we have copied them as they appear. General Little thinks that they are not National decorations, but have come from other sources.

Captain Puleston, who is one of the biographers of Mahan, is writing to one or more of the daughters to see if he can discover what these medals are.

In view of this pastel I have decided not to answer your questions on the color of the face, etc., but will rely on the pastel to answer for me.

Admiral Conolly is so impressed with the pastel which, by the way, was done by one of the War College artists, Mr. Thomas A. Synnott, that he wants Mr. Synnott, as a private accomplishment, to copy the portrait done of himself by a Boston artist for the War College.

0505

If I can be of any further help to you, you have but to command me.

Things are changing a little bit here as Admiral Conolly is about to leave. We don't know what plans are in store.

With very best regards to yourself and Delight, I am, as ever,

Your old friend,

R.W. BATES

Rear Admiral Chester C. Wood, USN
The National War College
Washington 25, D.C.

0506

October 22, 1953

Dear Frank:

It was a great pleasure to sit down with you and talk about various matters, but notably about my translator Mrs. Lily Y. Tanaka who, as you know, is at present under Op-34 and who Admiral Schindler suggested be moved to Op-29. Admiral Schindler said that he did not plan to drop her-- that he merely wanted to get her properly located. It was very reassuring to hear from you that she would not be dropped. Very frankly, if necessary, I am ready now to say definitely that I do not wish to hold her after 30 June 1954, and hope to release her earlier.

Finally, I want to reiterate what Mrs. Tanaka heard in the National Archives. She said that they told her that there might be a request from the Japanese Government presently asking for the return of the Naval Documents and if such a request came they would transfer them, possibly without reference to the Navy Department. I can not quite tell you of my concern about this, because I think that all documents should be translated, or if they can not be translated now, should be photostated so that we at least have a copy. I had thought of recommending microfilming these documents but it is an awfully hard job to translate from microfilm.

For your information, I understand there are about twenty-three boxes of Japanese documents in the Archives. Nothing has been done about them.

I am very pleased that you have the assignment of Op-02. You take it in your stride and are not overwhelmed by the responsibility of the office. That is as it should be.

With very best regards and many thanks for your assurance in regards to Mrs. Tanaka, I am,

Your old friend,

Rear Admiral Frank T. Watkins, USN
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
(Administration)
Op-02 PENTAGON BUILDING
Navy Department
Washington 25, D.C.

R.W. BATES

0507

November 6, 1953

Dear Willie:

As you know, I am working on the Battle for Leyte Gulf up here. To accomplish this in a reasonable time I have assistants which unfortunately have been changing every two years.

I have finished Volume I and I am now in the middle of Volume II of this battle. Volume I will go to the press this month and will probably be out around February 1954. Volume II will not go to press for some time, however, I hope to come near finishing it by Fall. Volume II will take us until the morning of October 23rd when our submarines discovered the Japanese FIRST Striking Force. Volume III and possibly Volume IV, if one is required, will include the battles off Cape Engano and the Battle of Samar. It will also include the Battle of Suriago Strait. I am working on that battle now because I happen to have an officer of competence available to assist me on it.

Commander Walter Barry from the War College is coming down to see Captain Renard relative to personnel requirements for my work here as well as for the War College. These officers are to replace the officers that will be relieved for sea duty in June. I have asked Commander Barry to speak to Captain Renard about my problems here. I find it very difficult to work on this book when I have to detach my people just about the time they have become familiar with my needs and method of operating, so this time I have been hoping that I could obtain one or two line officers from you who are carrier-trained, as well as graduates of the Naval War College. The reason for this latter requirement is that the work I am doing is somewhat along War College lines and this saves time. I should prefer to have an officer who could remain three years with me rather than one with one year at the War College and two years with me. So I have recommended to Commander Barry that some one like Captain A.R. Matters or Captain D.C. Richardson would be good. Rather than either of these two officers I should like very much to get Commander

0508

Paul E. Hartmann, USN, now Executive Officer of the USS LEYTE, because Commander Hartmann worked with me on Volume I and is familiar with the problems.

I spoke to Commander Hartmann about this and he said that he would like to go to Europe for duty, but failing in this he would like to come here, and did not object to his name being forwarded. I hope you will help me in this matter and will do what you can to ensure that someone of quality is sent here to assist me.

It is too bad that, when I get to Washington, I don't see you as often as I used to, but for some reason or another I never seem able to sit down with you to discuss old times.

Your good friend and mine Rear Admiral Don Varian is going to Washington shortly and you should see him about the time you get this letter.

Take care of yourself!

With very best regards, I am, as ever,

Your old friend,

R.W. BATES

Rear Admiral William L. Rees, USN
ACNO, OPNAV Room 4E388 Pentagon Building
Department of the Navy
Washington 25, D.C.

November 10, 1953

Dear Lee:

I have been growing more and more concerned because the film "Battle of Savo Island" is presumably progressing at Film Graphics without any advice whatsoever from the Naval War College.

As you know, the Naval War College is listed as the technical advisor and I have been designated to fulfill that assignment. Since the Naval Photographic Center and the other Washington groups know nothing of what I wish in this movie and since it is a Naval War College movie, I willy nilly become more or less the producer.

You, of course, know something about what I wish since you have already completed one film. But, if you will recollect, we had considerable trouble in getting that film right. Likewise, I had great difficulty with another film company in getting another battle film correct because no one really knew what was desired but myself. Other people, notably those in Washington, tried to tell the film company what was wanted. Unfortunately, it was not what was wanted at all so I was forced to reject the entire original work which was expensive not only to the film company but to the government. From all of this you can readily see that it is essential that the War College representative--myself--see the product at fairly frequent intervals in order to ensure that it is progressing satisfactorily from the War College viewpoint.

To date, much to my surprise, I have not been invited to see any portion of this film nor consulted in any way. This seems very surprising to me because I certainly hope that you do not intend to present me with a "fait accompli". That would be too bad if it was unsatisfactory.

Of course, I have no idea what you have accomplished so far or whether you have even started on it, but I feel sure that you have. If this is correct, it seems to me that it

0510

would be wise to invite the War College representative--
myself--to be present in order to avoid unnecessary waste
of time and effort.

I hope all goes well with you and yours. With best regards,
I am,

Very sincerely yours,

R.W. BATES

Mr. Lee Blair
Film Graphics
245 W. 55th Street
New York, N.Y.

November 17, 1953

Dear Captain McKillip:

In accordance with your request contained in your letter of 11 September 1953 (Op-533/VAW), I am sending you herewith additional material from which you may compile the weather data on the Battle for Leyte Gulf. This material consists of Chapters I to VI of Volume II--Volume I has been already completed--and covers three days, October 17th, 18th and 19th, which are the only days completed of Volume II. You will observe that the Chapters have been marked with a Red "W" for ease in locating the weather comments. These "Ws" are on the following pages:

5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 24, 51, 54, 76, 147, 163, 173, 174, 177, 189, 195, 198, 199, 208, 211, 216, 230, 231, 235, 240, 249, 251, 258, 271, 276, 306, 319, 324, 344, 375, 406, 408, 414, 415, 429, 433, 435, 454, 517.

It is requested that the weather data be compiled to cover the area embraced by the diagram with particular emphasis on the Philippine area since it is in that area that the principal action occurred. So much for that!

New subject:

I was particularly pleased to observe that you had relieved Captain Minter as Head, Naval Aerology Branch, because you understand our problems very well whereas someone else might not have your understanding and considerable ^{time} might be lost in trying to explain our needs.

I trust you will find time personally to read these six Chapters. It is my hope that if you see any errors or

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if you disagree with the analysis anywhere you will give me the benefit of your opinions.

With many thanks for your interest in this matter, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

R.W. BATES

Captain J.C.S. McKillip, USN
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Op-533, Room 5E609 Pentagon Building
Department of the Navy
Washington 25, D.C.

Encls/(1) BPLG Chps I to VI
(2) Three Diagrams

November 30, 1953

Dear Admiral Larson:

I am calling for a little help and guidance.

My office rates as its officer allowance, in addition to myself, two 1100 officers and two 1300 officers. At the present time I have one 1100 (Commander Charles E. Marinke) and two 1300 (Commanders Albert H. Bowker and Stanley E. Hindman). I am entitled to one additional 1100 officer, but since I did not require him I did not ask for him. Now I feel that I require him so presently when I am in Washington I will discuss the vacancy with BuPers. I should like to get him now so that the Japanese air data now developed by Commander Hindman will not be lost. Time is important in my work.

As you perhaps know, it is customary in my office for the Staff to change every two years. I am trying now, in view of the fact that the next group will solve the Battles of Samar and Cape Engano, to obtain a competent Staff. One officer who has been promised to me as a relief for Commander Marinke is Captain George Veth who is a graduate of the War College. I have been advised for sometime that I was to get him, but now I hear rumors that your boys are beginning to temporize. Please tell them to lay-off Captain Veth and assign him to me.

A part of my trouble here stems somewhat from the fact that Captain Rochefort, who translated and assisted me in Japanese matters, was summarily retired without replacement. Is there any chance of getting Captain Rochefort back? He is not an analyst of any great consequence, but he does understand the Japanese and is thoroughly familiar with the Japanese operations. I used him primarily to argue out my concepts of Japanese operations and to translate when I needed it. If I cannot get him who can I get? Naturally, I prefer a graduate of the Naval War College.

This morning the Chief of Staff advised me that BuPers had offered me Captain George Phelan. However, Captain Phelan is definitely unsatisfactory as he has only one year left and it would take him almost that time to catch up with the picture. Besides this I understand he wishes duty in the

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EIGHTH Naval District. So I have given the Chief of Staff a definite negative. Without being critical of Captain Phelan who is quite smart, I must say that I cannot accept officers for this work for a limited time only. My assistants this time must be here for at least two years, and preferably for three years since this group should complete the work on Leyte Gulf.

As I told you some time ago, Admiral Conolly has released Volume I, saying that it was fine, so I am expecting to bring it down for publication.

I don't like to place this matter before you; it has not been necessary heretofore, but the BuPers' boys naturally do not understand the nature of my problems and therefore are likely to make decisions which would be hurtful to my project.

I must have assistants who are (a) graduates of the Naval War College, (b) are competent analysts and (c) are not too difficult to get along with. Captain Veth is one who fills that bill and I would like a definite firming of his assignment.

I hope that you enjoyed your Thanksgiving holiday and that the after effect of the turkey did not persist for long. I saw the Army-Navy Game and wasn't impressed with Navy because it lacked knowledge of the fundamentals, i.e., blocking, tackling and holding on to the ball. The Army looked very good.

With best regards and many thanks for whatever you may do for me, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

R.W. BATES

Rear Admiral Harold O. Larson, USN
Bureau of Naval Personnel
Room 3074 ARLINGTON ANNEX
Department of the Navy
Washington 25, D.C.

RWB:mwb

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December 14, 1953

Dear Willie:

Thank you very much for your letter of December 11th with reference primarily to Commander Bowker. Naturally I would be the last person in the world to interfere in any way with Commander Bowker's promotion and if your staff really believe that it would be better for him to go to sea that of course is satisfactory to me although a disappointment. Tomorrow I am sending Commander Bowker to Washington for duty on other matters and I have asked him to drop in and bring you this letter, so that he may discuss with you and your staff the whole situation and may learn what is in store for him should he go to sea. I hope that you will find time to talk to him very freely, and perhaps you can obtain from him some thoughts on the kind of personnel required for this office.

Your Captain Christopher sent me word today via Captain Dorsett that he had heard nothing regarding my needs. I hope Commander Bowker will explain to him and to you that I am not working directly with him, but instead with you as per your request.

I should like to retain Commander Bowker for one year if it will not endanger his career. There is no pressure on him from the War College and the suggestion to remain originated entirely with him because he thinks that he has completed successfully all the sea duty necessary for promotion.

I hope that you have something good for Commander Bowker since he has done very well here at the War College. If you will remember he is the successor of a long line of graduates of the World War II Battle Evaluation Group who have succeeded admirably later. Among these are W. H. Ashford, David C. Richardson, J. O. Cobb, Paul E. Hartmann, Walter Innis and Donald Ramage.

It was nice to see you the other day, in fact it is always nice to "shoot the breeze with you for a little while." It brings back a certain nostalgia for the old days even though Captain Babcock insisted that we make 110% every day underway and 140% in port. No wonder you went into naval aviation. Perhaps I should have done the same thing!

With best regards to yourself and Admiral Ofstie I am,
as ever,

Rear Admiral William L. Rees, USN
OPNAV Room 4E388 PENTAGON Building
Department of the Navy
Washington 25, D. C.

Your old friend,
R. W. BATES

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December 28, 1953

Dear Professor Armstrong:

I am sorry that I have delayed answering your letter of November 12th relative to the failure of the Navy TBS, voice radio, to function satisfactorily at the Battle of Savo Island. I was delayed in replying, however, as I wished to obtain some information from the Navy Department which information was received only this morning.

So far as I know, there has been no study made of any TBS failures at the Battle of Savo Island.

I think that TBS did not operate satisfactorily at Savo Island for three reasons. These reasons were:

- (1) The limited effective range of TBS.
- (2) The fact that the transmission of TBS messages was interfered with seriously throughout the battle by the employment of the TBS simultaneously by many ships.
- (3) The failure of interior communication system within certain of the ships to function adequately.

With reference to item (1) above you are correct in your assertion that this was an AM rather than a FM system, but this is not considered to have been the reason for the difficulties incident to the failure to receive relatively long-range transmissions (over twenty miles). In this connection I should like to point out that the BLUE, RALPH TALBOT, the CHICAGO Group and the VINCENNES Group were generally within twenty miles of one another, with sometimes nothing but blue water between them, and sometimes with Savo Island intervening. I understand that twenty miles was well beyond the normal reliable range of the TBS, although longer transmissions were by no means uncommon. As you know, in many instances, the governing factor in range is the antenna radiation pattern where a completely circular pattern is the goal, but in practice such a circular pattern is rare and difficult to achieve.

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At the time of the Battle of Savo Island antenna pattern studies had not been carried on in great detail and the seriousness of non-circular patterns, although recognized as a theoretical problem, did not receive the attention which it well merited. Therefore, excepting for technical failures it is not impossible that the communication difficulties were caused in a large part by the effect of distance and non-circular antenna patterns possibly magnified by poor receiver or transmitter adjustment.

The Navy's choice of AM was made only after a long series of tests. My understanding is that, as a result of these tests the Navy discovered that there was no advantage in the use of FM because at the extremities of range, signals were equally weak with both FM and AM and because of the "capture" effect to which FM is very susceptible, i.e. a strong signal will over-ride and take control preventing a weaker signal from a distance from getting through.

Item (2) needs little comment here because it is obvious that if everyone is trying to broadcast at once there results nothing but confusion.

Item (3) can be best explained by an example as follows:

The PATTERSON, which had observed the Japanese cruisers entering the waters of Iron Bottom Sound, sent out a message reporting this contact at 0146 August 9th. This message does not appear to have been received by anybody. Why this was so has not been discovered. The PATTERSON's second report issued at 0147½, or 1½ minutes later, was received by a number of the ships, notably VINCENNES, QUINCY, RALPH TALEBOT, MONSSEN, and BUCHANAN, the latter two being within the SAN JUAN Group. It is significant that neither the ASTORIA nor the HELM received this message, possibly because the VINCENNES at this time was sending out a course change. The Commanding Officer VINCENNES, who was the commander of the VINCENNES Group, likewise did not receive the message which had been received by his TBS operator likely because of the confusion incident to sending out the course change.

I hope the above answers your queries. I am sure that you can readily see that the above facts, when compounded with the factors of surprise and fatigue, could make almost any

communication system unsatisfactory in performance.

As I am a graduate of Columbia--that is a 1922 post-graduate in engineering--I was happy to hear from you since your fame is well-established.

With best wishes for the New Year, I am,

Sincerely yours,

R.W. BATES
Rear Admiral, USN(Ret)

Professor Edwin H. Armstrong
Department of Electrical Engineering
Columbia University
New York 27, N.Y.

RWB:mwb